The Kantian View of Animal Ethics

Kants moral philosophy of Metaphysics A Response To the Charge of Speciesism I. In this paper I pass on present the charge of speciesism contended by many animate being rights diddleivists. I pass on attempt to substantiate Immanuel Kants view on animal incorrupt philosophy and justify how his philosophy is non in colza of speciesism. Furthermore, I will explain how the Kantian view still grants animals several(prenominal) honorable consideration by means of the designation of mediate duties. Lastly, I will present a difficulty with accepting the Kantian view of indirect duties towards animals.Moral quandaries regarding animals ar still demanding the attention of many philosophers as they attempt to veer and inspect the relationship surrounded by morality and social policy. Contemporary applications of this disregard set up range from experimentations on animals for developing medicines (or even cosmetics) to whether pitying beings should annul eating animal-base d foods. There is a vast spectrum of moral issues that arise with maintain to animals. However, most of the morally interrogativeable situations ar contingent on iodine fundamental question do animals even deplete moral rights?And if so, to what tip? Although animal moral considerability has peaked the interest of many contemporary philosophers, such(prenominal) as James Rachels and Peter Singer, the question is unfeignedly an age-old question that can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. Immanuel Kant has probed the question of whether an animal has moral considerability. Kant endlessly makes the distinction between piece and animals throughout his best-known contri exceptions to moral philosophy.Therefore, I will address and present the counter-argument to the charge of speciesism, single of critical arguments of the animal rights movement, through a Kantian lens. II. One of the prevailing charges on gentles being proposed by champions of animal rights is that huma ns act in violation of speciesism. The term, number maven coined by psychologist Richard Ryder in 1973, is used to describe an despotic bias that humans have towards their own species (Homo sapiens).The argument is as follows to assign primacy to humans by considering solely a human to be within the constitution of morality is similar to other types of discrimination, such as racism and sexism. Just as in racism and sexism the dominating force haphazard assumes itself as the prescriptive ideal, in this case whites or males respectively, so too human beings arbitrarily assume themselves as the ideal and to be the only species deserving of morality. Therefore, because on that point is no legitimate basis for this distinction, other species of animals should be equally include within the system of morality.Ryder sees that those in violation of speciesism overlook and underestimate the similarities between the discriminator (humans) and those discriminated against (animals or any other species). His argument assumes that most animals are fundamentally the sympatheticred. Of course those who charge human to be guilty of speciesism take that there are obvious differences between humans and non-humans. They just believe these differences to be irrelevant for delineating the scope of a moral system. Mans higher recognition, being the most conspicuous difference, should have no potence on morality.If intelligence were the decisive grammatical constituent then it would follow that populate who are intellectually superior should be treated with superior moral standards. Moreover, some apes could potencely have more intelligence than a human if the human was insane or otherwise intellectually compromised. Thus, although intelligence is the distinguishing factor between most human beings and non-humans, it can non be the sole quantity for specify a moral system . III. It would appear that aside from intelligence (that has no moral bearing) there is no f undamental quality that separates humans and non-humans.Therefore, animals really should be treated with equal moral standards, and those who do not rival moral rights are guilty of speciesism. Philosopher Michael Pollan challenges Kant with being in violation of arbitrary discrimination of animals none of these (Kants) argument cross the charge of speciesism (pg 439 Vice and Virtue). So we are left with the daunting question is there any grimness to Pollans claim? At first it would appear that Kant presupposes human beings as the only species worthy of morality without giving any explanatory criterion. Kant evelops one of his foundational doctrines called The Categorical Imperative, which can be summarized in the following article of faith Act in such a way that you treat world in such a way, whether in ourselves or in others, as an end in itself (Groundwork II). It seems that Kant believes that human beings bar none deserve what he calls respect or what we are calling moral c onsideration. However, after a closer examination it becomes apparent that Kant is not guilty of speciesism at all. In a remarkably similar excerpt Kant says, as able beings, we essential always at the same time be respectd as ends (pg 239 4430).It is almost as if Kant just substituted the phrase humanity with quick of scent beings. When both excerpts are read in conjunction it becomes apparent that Kant includes human beings into his moral system not because of an arbitrary nepotism towards his own kind (homo sapiens) but because of a human beings attribute of noeticity. In other words, Kants criterion for moral considerability is rationality and not intelligence. When Kant says to treat humanity in such a way, he is referring to a humans rational nature, which happens to be the unique quality of human beings and is thus presented as rationalitys synonym.According to Kant, rationality is not the same as intelligence and is what makes human beings worthy of moral consideration and animals unworthy. Rationality is the ability to be governed autonomously and make advised decisions of what is right and wrong. It is not the ability to display conclude skills. Therefore, a being, such as a chimpanzee with excellent cognitive abilities, cannot exercise rationality, which is Kants basis for morality. piece beings, on the other hand, locomote to a Kingdom of Ends, where moral laws are meticulously chosen by each individual.This capability to discern and choose which laws have absolute moral worth binds all human beings in a cohesive moral community. Each member of this community has the authority to legislate and decide which laws are unconditional and then subsequently act in accordance with those laws. non even the highest functioning chimpanzee has the capability to decide whether an action can be universally applied. Nor can a chimpanzee mull over the question what ought I do? . Thus it follows that a person only has obligations towards other beings that can obligate themselves, or act rationally.Kant chose rationality as the marker that defines the line of required morality because of its pureness. Rational knowledge is not influenced by history, anthropology or psychology. It is not qualified by emotion. Other potential values, such as intelligence, have the possibility of being used amorally Intelligence and wit are doubtless in many see good and desirable but they can also become highly harmful if the willis not good (pg 231). Consequently, a beings rationality, the ability to decide whether an action is good universally, is the only incorruptible value that could define the scope of morality..Now that it is clear that Kant is not guilty of speciesism, since his moral system is predicated on the standard of rationality, one can still ask how Kantian morals views animals. Kantian Ethics prescribes indirect duties towards animals. This means that it is wrong to act maliciously towards animals because it will damage a persons s ympathies. change ones sympathies will inevitability lead to a failure of ones duties to others. On the one hand, animals cannot be granted direct duties, for they lack rationality. Their moral value is reason in a sort of limbo between inanimate objects and human beings.On a practical level, a Kantian might perform the same actions towards animals as a Utilitarian would. But Kantian Ethics is toughened for many philosophers, at least in theory. Christina Hoff offers an example where a kind man spends his life fulfilling his duties to himself and towards other human beings except he on the QT burns stray dogs to death. Despite how disturbing and wrong this seems, Kantian ethics does not consider this man as having committed any outlaw(a) action in and of itself. The suffering of the dogs is only problematic as it affects our duties to rational beings.It is difficult to challenge the Kantian view of animals on philosophical grounds. The Kantian moral system is consistent in that it is rooted in the given that rationality alone has absolute moral value. To challenge this assumption would bespeak dismantling Kants entire moral system by presentation why rationality is inadequate as the supreme value. When Kant is concerned with negative our sympathies he is only concerned in so far as sympathies ability to promote rationality and the ability to fulfill ones duties. He does not award sympathy any independent value.Yet, to allow, even if just in theory, the scenario of the man burning dogs seems against common morality. To be indifferent to an animals suffering is intuitively immoral. An animal rights champion would be more likely do sweep up a Utilitarian view, which incorporates suffering into the fabric of its moral system. IV. Consequently, Kant can evade attempts to label him guilty of speciesism. Kantian ethics does have a criterion that differentiates humans and non-humans. With rationality as its hallmark, Kantian Ethics views animals as deserving of only indirect moral considerability.As Christine Korsgaard explains in her essay Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, moral laws may be viewed as the laws legislated by all rational beings in the Kingdom of Ends (pg 5) Animals incidentally do not share this force for rationality. But if they did, they would surely be included. Interestingly, when referring to animals he ambiguously labels them as a human beings analogue. Perhaps Kant was identifying that animals have similar qualities such as intelligence that link us together. But animals are analogues and not exactly similar.As such, Kant grants animals some moral considerabilitiy, through indirect duties, but not equal moral considerability. A being earns moral considerability only through the capacity to implement the Categorical Imperative and exercise an autonomous level of cognition, not through reasoning skills or mathematical abilities. Therefore, animals rightfully have moral limitations. Works Cited 1)Ryder, Rich ard. Richard Ryder All Beings That Feel Pain Deserve Human Rights World News The Guardian. Latest News, Sport and Comment from the Guardian The Guardian. Web. 27 Dec. 2011. 2)Kant, Immanuel, and H. J. Paton. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York Harper & Row, 1964. Print. 3)Sommers, Christina, Frederic Tamler Sommers. Vice and Virtue in normal Life. Belmont, CA Wadsworth, 2003. Print 4)Korsgaard, Christine M. Fellow Creatures Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals. Www. Tannerlectures. utah. edu. University of Utah mechanical press Volume 25/26. Web Authors personal website 5)Sebo, Jeff. A Critique of the Kantian Theory of Indirect Moral Duties to Animals. Animal exit Philosophy and Policy Journal Volume II Pp. 1-14, 2004. Web.